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On May 12, the day that David Cameron invited Libya’s rebel leaders to set up a formal office in London, National Transitional Council Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil made a number of statements at a press conference at the FCO which, reading between the lines, could suggest that some of Libya’s trade agreements with Russia may be at risk in the future if the NTC’s forces manage to take power.
Russia has long seen Gaddafi as a key ally in the Arab world. In 2008, then-President Vladimir Putin visited Tripoli and announced that $4.5bn in Libyan debt would be cancelled in exchange for major contracts for Russian energy and construction firms, including an exploration and extraction deal for the state-owned Gazprom and the construction of a $13bn pipeline through Algeria and Niger. The debt deal also included a multi-billion dollar contract for Russian Railways, and, in January last year, Putin announced a $1.8bn arms deal, which reportedly included a fighter aircraft and tanks.
Though Russia abstained from the March 17 UN Security Council vote authorising the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Libya, Prime Minister Putin was later quoted comparing the resolution to a ‘medieval call to crusade’. Moscow has since criticised NATO forces for overstepping their mandate and called for negotiations between the rebels and Muammar Gaddafi, in contrast to the view espoused by most western politicians that there is no room for Gaddafi in the future Libyan state.
When asked about Russia, Jalil commented that Russia has made it clear that it supports Gaddafi, and that while the NTC respects Moscow’s decision and would continue to honour legal agreements between Russia and Libya ‘when’ they are victorious, Russia’s continued support for Gaddafi and failure to establish any relationship with the NTC could have an impact on relations in the future.
The real keyword here, though, is ‘legal’. Earlier in the press conference, Jalil made sure to distinguish between ‘legal’ agreements and treaties, which he said Libya would honour with all states, and those that were clearly made as a result of ‘obvious financial corruption’. With Russia and Libya ranked 2.1 and 2.2 respectively on last year’s Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 being the worst and anything under 3 being considered highly corrupt), it’s not a massive stretch to imagine that, in the event of an NTC victory in Libya, some of those oil investments and lucrative arms deals with Russia may be more thoroughly examined and found wanting.
Meanwhile, Jalil refused to be drawn on either the possible partition of Libya or the NTC’s views on relations with Israel. In fact, he initially refused to answer questions on either from BBC Arabic’s correspondent, calling them ‘provocative’. Eventually, he relented to say that Libya was indivisible, that the state the NTC sees itself representing is and always will be unified.
As for Israel, Jalil said simply that it would be ‘another matter to consider when victory is achieved.’ I’m not sure what, if anything, can be drawn from this latter response. To be honest, the NTC has enough to deal with right now without embroiling itself in a debate on Israel and angering either its Western or Arab allies in the process. Though Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are the only Arab governments to have officially recognised the NTC, the revolution is highly popular on the Arab street and the NTC has been somewhat recognised by the Arab League. This position isn’t worth risking over a hypothetical discussion on Israel, and nor can UK and US support be jeopardised by coming out against Israel.
It’s worth considering that, while it’s unlikely that the NTC’s position on Israel will be a central issue any time soon – at the very least not until they are actually in control of the country – its policy may be shaped by other factors liable to come to the fore in the meantime. Before any new Libyan government comes to power or has a chance to formulate foreign policy, it will have time to observe the decisions (and subsequent consequences) of its Egyptian counterparts in the Supreme Military Council. Egypt’s relationship with Israel is, of course, more complicated, but the NATO involvement in Libya may mean that the West has more influence over the NTC than it does the SMC, or at least that the NTC might care what the West thinks a bit more. With the recent reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories and the Quartet’s September 2 deadline for a two-state solution looming, it’s also possible that, by the time the NTC has a chance to worry about its Israel policy, the situation on the ground will have changed.
On a final note – after all of the debate over the purpose of UK foreign policy and the motives behind taking action in Libya and not in other states where it may be equally warranted (Syria, Bahrain), it struck a slightly odd chord to see Jalil at pains to thank the UK government for taking a ‘moral stand’ based on humanity and not self-interest or future considerations. I attended a discussion on Libya at the Frontline Club back in March, in the early days of the Libyan revolution but before the UN Security Council had approved military intervention, where former UK Ambassador to Libya Richard Dalton advocated for a British foreign policy that is first and foremost self-interested; British policy toward Libya should be (and, Dalton argued, is) based primarily on what is in the long-term best interests of the UK.
The idea that none of the countries involved in Libya went in without considering the potential consequences for political relations, trade and migration is naive and, if true, would indicate a dearth of intelligence in the respective foreign offices. Not even the FCO would argue that British foreign policy is based solely on morality or humanity. In a July 2010 speech, the first of four setting out the UK’s new approach to foreign policy, Foreign Secretary William Hague spoke of policies that extend British ‘global reach and influence’ and use ‘diplomacy to secure our prosperity’. He also focused on the need to protect UK security in an increasingly globalised world. The fact that Jalil’s gratitude for Britain’s ‘moral stand’ followed directly after his discussion of illegal immigration into Libya and on into southern Europe suggests his statement is borne out of something more than naivety. So I can only guess at Jalil’s reasons for making a statement that is just so clearly untrue; was it just a soundbite that his UK hosts can use to defend intervention against critics who say they have no business interfering in Libya, to prove that NATO forces are wanted and respected by the Libyan rebels? Or perhaps an attempt at cosying up further to the UK government, which, despite authorising a UK office for the NTC has not yet officially recognised them as more than ‘legitimate interlocutors’?
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