Showing posts with label work blog. Show all posts
Showing posts with label work blog. Show all posts

Thursday, 2 June 2011

Does the IMF Need a European Leader?

Another cross-post from the work blog.
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Between now and the selection of the new IMF Managing Director on June 30, the three European countries responsible for 40% of the IMF’s current lending commitments will seldom be out of the spotlight. Portugal is due to choose the government that will ultimately have to implement the policies to secure its €78bn bailout. The Greek government will have to present yet more austerity measures and implement privatisation of €50bn in government assets in order to secure the next tranche of its loan, which is reportedly at risk of not being released, and faces GDP figures, bond repayments and in all likelihood a general strike before the month is up. Ireland will desperately seek a cut in the interest rates on its €85bn bailout as it fights off rumours that another one will be needed.

As the IMF leadership decision draws nearer, there can be no doubt about the importance of the relationship between the Fund and Europe. But what does that mean for the board tasked with selecting Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s replacement?

While there are nominally at least two candidates to become the next MD, and by some accounts as many as five, all eyes are going to be on the European candidate, France’s Christine Lagarde, when nominations close on June 10. And not because she’s the frontrunner: June 10 is also the day that France’s Court of Justice is expected to decide whether Lagarde will face a judicial review over her role in the 2007 Tapie affair.

Lagarde, who was widely tipped for the job even before Strauss-Kahn officially resigned on May 18 amid allegations of sexual assault against a New York chambermaid, was the first to declare her candidacy and did so despite the question mark over whether her intervention in a legal dispute between tycoon Bernard Tapie and Credit Lyonnais, which saw Tapie awarded €285m in damages from the then public owned bank, constituted an abuse of authority. But if judges rule next week that Lagarde should be formally investigated, can she still go ahead with the IMF candidacy?

When Lagarde was appointed Finance Minister in 2007, she became the first woman to be put in charge of the finances of a G8 country. If she goes ahead with her candidacy and is successful, she will be the first woman appointed to the head of one of the world’s most powerful financial institutions since its inception in 1945. However, if the judicial review goes ahead, Lagarde could become the second IMF chief in one year to go before the courts, a scandal the IMF would be keen to avoid.

There’s clearly a strong argument that Lagarde should not be touted as a shoo-in for the job with a legal black cloud hanging over her head. However, the long-standing tradition that says that the IMF chief is always European has been a hard one to shake, especially in an age of high-profile IMF lending to European countries. European leaders have thrown their support behind Lagarde, arguing that a European MD, and one that has previously shown support for bailouts, is needed to understand the fiscal and structural problems and solutions in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. At present, there’s only one candidate who fits the bill.

But does the IMF really need a European to solve a European problem? After all, during the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s, nobody suggested that having an Argentine at the helm of the IMF would be a good idea. Could the experience of candidates from emerging economies be just the ticket? Banco de Mexico Governor Agustin Carstens is so far the only publicly declared candidate, with former South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel and Kazakh National Bank Chairman Grigory Marchenko also rumoured to be contenders. Carstens argues that a Latin American who has experienced debt crises but has a good fiscal record is what’s actually needed to help mend the problems in the euro zone.

Aside from that experience, a non-European candidate also brings distance from Europe, which European leaders may fear, but could be exactly what the IMF needs. It may be that someone who doesn’t feel a national attachment to preserving the euro is better able to make critical decisions on IMF lending to the euro zone; it may also be that during the next MD’s five year term, focus will shift and crises will emerge elsewhere, mooting the current ‘need’ for a European leader.

The French judges’ decision next week should give us a clearer picture of where the IMF race is headed. If Lagarde is cleared by the Court of Justice, she is all but certain to be appointed MD, unless the US throws its support behind Carstens. If the Court rules in favour of a judicial review, Lagarde’s success is much less clear-cut. Barring the sudden, last-minute declaration of a second European candidate, a withdrawal would mean the likely appointment of Carstens.

Disastrous as an inquiry would be for Lagarde and the French political sphere, it need not be a crisis for Europe and the IMF. Any competent managing director will be able to negotiate and handle the existing EU bailouts, and the IMF could benefit from the opportunity to appoint its leader based solely on merit rather than at least partially on nationality, as well as the chance to be more representative of emerging economies.

The benefits of a non-European MD deserve to be considered whether Lagarde remains in the running or not, and certainly when the next appointment comes around. Europe will not be able to claim forever that it is at the same time most competent to run the IMF and most in need of its help.

Monday, 16 May 2011

The Future of Libyan Foreign Relations

Cross-posted from my work blog, which I'll post the link to some other time - we're just getting up and running right now, sort of a work in progress.

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On May 12, the day that David Cameron invited Libya’s rebel leaders to set up a formal office in London, National Transitional Council Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil made a number of statements at a press conference at the FCO which, reading between the lines, could suggest that some of Libya’s trade agreements with Russia may be at risk in the future if the NTC’s forces manage to take power.

Russia has long seen Gaddafi as a key ally in the Arab world. In 2008, then-President Vladimir Putin visited Tripoli and announced that $4.5bn in Libyan debt would be cancelled in exchange for major contracts for Russian energy and construction firms, including an exploration and extraction deal for the state-owned Gazprom and the construction of a $13bn pipeline through Algeria and Niger. The debt deal also included a multi-billion dollar contract for Russian Railways, and, in January last year, Putin announced a $1.8bn arms deal, which reportedly included a fighter aircraft and tanks.

Though Russia abstained from the March 17 UN Security Council vote authorising the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Libya, Prime Minister Putin was later quoted comparing the resolution to a ‘medieval call to crusade’. Moscow has since criticised NATO forces for overstepping their mandate and called for negotiations between the rebels and Muammar Gaddafi, in contrast to the view espoused by most western politicians that there is no room for Gaddafi in the future Libyan state.

When asked about Russia, Jalil commented that Russia has made it clear that it supports Gaddafi, and that while the NTC respects Moscow’s decision and would continue to honour legal agreements between Russia and Libya ‘when’ they are victorious, Russia’s continued support for Gaddafi and failure to establish any relationship with the NTC could have an impact on relations in the future.

The real keyword here, though, is ‘legal’. Earlier in the press conference, Jalil made sure to distinguish between ‘legal’ agreements and treaties, which he said Libya would honour with all states, and those that were clearly made as a result of ‘obvious financial corruption’. With Russia and Libya ranked 2.1 and 2.2 respectively on last year’s Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 being the worst and anything under 3 being considered highly corrupt), it’s not a massive stretch to imagine that, in the event of an NTC victory in Libya, some of those oil investments and lucrative arms deals with Russia may be more thoroughly examined and found wanting.

Meanwhile, Jalil refused to be drawn on either the possible partition of Libya or the NTC’s views on relations with Israel. In fact, he initially refused to answer questions on either from BBC Arabic’s correspondent, calling them ‘provocative’. Eventually, he relented to say that Libya was indivisible, that the state the NTC sees itself representing is and always will be unified.

As for Israel, Jalil said simply that it would be ‘another matter to consider when victory is achieved.’ I’m not sure what, if anything, can be drawn from this latter response. To be honest, the NTC has enough to deal with right now without embroiling itself in a debate on Israel and angering either its Western or Arab allies in the process. Though Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are the only Arab governments to have officially recognised the NTC, the revolution is highly popular on the Arab street and the NTC has been somewhat recognised by the Arab League. This position isn’t worth risking over a hypothetical discussion on Israel, and nor can UK and US support be jeopardised by coming out against Israel.

It’s worth considering that, while it’s unlikely that the NTC’s position on Israel will be a central issue any time soon – at the very least not until they are actually in control of the country – its policy may be shaped by other factors liable to come to the fore in the meantime. Before any new Libyan government comes to power or has a chance to formulate foreign policy, it will have time to observe the decisions (and subsequent consequences) of its Egyptian counterparts in the Supreme Military Council. Egypt’s relationship with Israel is, of course, more complicated, but the NATO involvement in Libya may mean that the West has more influence over the NTC than it does the SMC, or at least that the NTC might care what the West thinks a bit more. With the recent reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas in the Palestinian Territories and the Quartet’s September 2 deadline for a two-state solution looming, it’s also possible that, by the time the NTC has a chance to worry about its Israel policy, the situation on the ground will have changed.

On a final note – after all of the debate over the purpose of UK foreign policy and the motives behind taking action in Libya and not in other states where it may be equally warranted (Syria, Bahrain), it struck a slightly odd chord to see Jalil at pains to thank the UK government for taking a ‘moral stand’ based on humanity and not self-interest or future considerations. I attended a discussion on Libya at the Frontline Club back in March, in the early days of the Libyan revolution but before the UN Security Council had approved military intervention, where former UK Ambassador to Libya Richard Dalton advocated for a British foreign policy that is first and foremost self-interested; British policy toward Libya should be (and, Dalton argued, is) based primarily on what is in the long-term best interests of the UK.

The idea that none of the countries involved in Libya went in without considering the potential consequences for political relations, trade and migration is naive and, if true, would indicate a dearth of intelligence in the respective foreign offices. Not even the FCO would argue that British foreign policy is based solely on morality or humanity. In a July 2010 speech, the first of four setting out the UK’s new approach to foreign policy, Foreign Secretary William Hague spoke of policies that extend British ‘global reach and influence’ and use ‘diplomacy to secure our prosperity’. He also focused on the need to protect UK security in an increasingly globalised world. The fact that Jalil’s gratitude for Britain’s ‘moral stand’ followed directly after his discussion of illegal immigration into Libya and on into southern Europe suggests his statement is borne out of something more than naivety. So I can only guess at Jalil’s reasons for making a statement that is just so clearly untrue; was it just a soundbite that his UK hosts can use to defend intervention against critics who say they have no business interfering in Libya, to prove that NATO forces are wanted and respected by the Libyan rebels? Or perhaps an attempt at cosying up further to the UK government, which, despite authorising a UK office for the NTC has not yet officially recognised them as more than ‘legitimate interlocutors’?